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In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment in developing countries and re-evaluate the role of the quality of institutions on FDI independently of the general level of development. We implement cross-section estimations based on a newly available database with unprecedented detail on institutions for a set of 52 countries, as well as panel data estimations based on Fraser Institute’s data.Furthermore,  ol for the corr l ion betw en institutions and GDP p r capita and for endogeneity of institutions. Finally, we evaluate whether the similarity of institutio s betwe  the host and the origin c untry raises bilateral FDI. We ﬁnd that a wid  range f instituti ns, including bur aucracy, corruption, but also informat on, banking sector and legal institutions, do matter for inward FDI independently of GDP per capiterestingly ak capital concentration a d strong employment protectio  tend to reduce inwar  FDI. I stitutional proximity between the origin and  host coun ry also ma ters, but w  ﬁnd little imp ct of inst tutions in the rigin country. These result  are encouraging in the sense th t efforts tow rds raising the quality of insti utions and making hem converge towards those of source count ies may help developing countri s to receive moreDI, inde ndently of the indir ct impact of higher GDP per capita. Th  orders of magnitude f und in the paper are large, an g that moving from a low lev l t  a high evel of in titutional qualit could have as much impac  as sudde ly b coming a n ighbour of a s rce country.
 
1. INTRODUCTION
S
 
INCE the late 1990s, the literature on economic development has been renewed
by focusing on the quality of domestic institutions as a key explanation of
cross-country differences in both growth rates and income per capita (see IMF,
2003; and Acemoglu et al., 2005, for recent surveys). In particular, efﬁcient
protection of civil and property rights, extended economic and political freedom
and low levels of corruption have been shown to be associated with higher prosperity.
Simultaneously, there has been a growing interest in the determinants of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries, as FDI is considered one
of the most stable components of capital ﬂows to developing countries and can
also be a vehicle for technological progress through the use and dissemination of
improved production techniques. Not surprisingly, thus, a number of authors
have also studied the link between institutions and FDI.
 
1
 
 Such a link could be seen
as one channel through which institutions promote productivity growth. Indeed,
good institutions are supposed to exert their positive inﬂuence on development
through the promotion of investment in general, which faces less uncertainty and
higher expected rates of return. Because FDI is now a very large share of capital
formation in poor countries (UNCTAD, 2004), the FDI-promoting effect of good
institutions might be an important channel of their overall effect on growth and
development.
There are several reasons why the quality of institutions may matter for
attracting FDI. One is rooted on the results of the growth literature: by raising
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 Recent examples are Kinoshina and Campos (2003) and Méon and Sekkat (2004) focusing on
transition economies and MENA countries, respectively.
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productivity prospects, good governance infrastructures may attract foreign
investors. A second reason is that poor institutions can bring additional costs to
FDI. This can be the case of corruption, for instance (Wei, 2000). A third reason is
that, due to high sunk costs, FDI is especially vulnerable to any form of uncertainty,
including uncertainty stemming from poor government efﬁciency, policy reversals,
graft or weak enforcement of property rights and of the legal system in general.
Measuring the impact of institutions on FDI encounters the classical problem
of reverse causality. Indeed, higher FDI could put pressure on governments to
improve institutions (see Selowski and Martin, 1997). The literature on institu-
tions and growth encounters the same difﬁculty, which is tackled through the use
of innovative instrumental variables for institutions (see Hall and Jones, 1999;
and Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2002). Contrasting with this literature, existing
studies on institutions and FDI do not tackle the potential endogeneity bias.
 
2
 
The second difﬁculty is that GDP per capita can be viewed as one driving
force of FDI. If the literature on institutions on growth is correct, there exists a
positive correlation between institutions and GDP per capita. Hence a positive
correlation between institutions and FDI could just stem from the impact of
institutions on GDP per capita.
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we re-examine
the role of institutions in the host and in the source country by estimating a
gravity equation for bilateral FDI stocks that includes governance indicators for
the two countries. Second, we tackle multicollinearity and endogeneity bias by
implementing a three-stage procedure for instrumentation and orthogonalisation.
Third, we look further into the detail of institutions by using a new database
constructed by the French Ministry of Finance network in 52 foreign countries.
This database is used to point out in some detail the relevant institutional
features. Its country coverage, which focuses on developing countries, is very
helpful for studying the impact of the institutional environment of the host coun-
try. It does not allow, however, to go deeply into the impact of the institutional
environment in the source country as well as into the impact of institutional
distance. Hence we complement our analysis with estimations based on the
Fraser database, which provides fewer details on institutions, albeit on a more
balanced country coverage between industrial and developing countries. Finally,
we study the impact of institutional distance on bilateral FDI.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of the
literature. Section 3 presents the databases on institutions. Section 4 details the
econometric methodology. The results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
 
2
 
 Larraín and Tavares (2004) study the impact of FDI on the extent of corruption, by instrumenting
FDI with a gravity model. Here we are concerned by the reverse problem, i.e. instrumenting
institutions in order to capture their speciﬁc impact on FDI.
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2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW
 
The literature on institutions and FDI is mainly devoted to studying the impact
of ‘good’ institutions on inward FDI. The impact of ‘institutional distance’
between the source country and the host country has been little investigated so far.
An early attempt to study the impact of institutions on FDI is Wheeler and
Mody (1992). Taking the ﬁrst principal component of 13 risk factors (including
bureaucratic red tape, political instability, corruption and the quality of the legal
system), they did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of ‘good’ institutions on the loca-
tion of US foreign afﬁliates. However, the index used included factors like the
living environment of expatriates or inequality which are not directly related to
the quality of institutions. Later studies by Wei (1997 and 2000) pointed out
corruption as a signiﬁcant impediment to inward FDI. This result was challenged
by Stein and Daude (2001) who argued that high collinearity between corruption
and GDP per capita could lead to spurious results when GDP per capita was not
included in the equation. Using a wider range of institution variables, they nevertheless
showed inward FDI to be signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the quality of institutions.
More speciﬁcally, ﬁve out of six governance indicators provided by Kaufman
et al. (1999) were shown to matter: political instability and violence, government
effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and graft. Only the voice-and-
accountability indicator appeared to be a non-signiﬁcant determinant of FDI.
Further regressions, using the International Country Risk Guide and LaPorta
et al. (1998) indicators, showed risk of repudiation of contracts by government,
risk of expropriation and shareholder rights to matter.
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) argue that the same factors should have an
impact on both inward and outward FDI. For instance, good institutions could
have a positive impact on FDI outﬂows because they create favourable conditions
for multinational companies to emerge, and hence to invest abroad. Consistently,
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) estimated the impact of the ﬁrst principal com-
ponent of the six governance indicators constructed by Kaufman et al. (1999) on
both inﬂows and outﬂows of a country’s FDI. They found good governance to
impact positively both on FDI inﬂows and outﬂows, although the latter effect is
only signiﬁcant for relatively large and developed countries. One limitation of
this study is that the institutional quality of the source country and of the host
country cannot be included at the same time since the estimations do not rely on
bilateral ﬂows. Hence, it is not possible to rank the importance of governance in
the source country compared to that of the host country. The impact of institutions
on FDI has more recently been analysed within the framework of gravity models
where FDI bilateral ﬂows or stocks essentially depend on GDP or population in
the source and/or the host country, and on the geographic distance between both
countries (Eaton and Tamura, 1994, provide an early application of the gravity
model to FDI).
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Another advantage of using bilateral data is the examination of the effect of
institutional distance between the host and the source country on FDI. Levchenko
(2004) suggests that institutional differences may be a source of comparative
advantages, some sectors being more ‘institution-intensive’ than others, and that
this could be a source of more trade ﬂows. To the extent that trade and FDI are
complements, this could raise FDI too. On the contrary, Aizenman and Spiegel
(2002), by using a principal-agent framework where 
 
ex-post
 
 monitoring of contracts
is more costly for foreign investors than for domestic ones, argue that the share
of FDI in total investment should be lower in countries with weak enforcement
of property rights. Then, if investors from weak institution countries face lower
costs (when investing in weak institution countries) than investors from strong
institution countries, this would entail that institutional distance between the
origin and the host country should have a negative impact on bilateral FDI. This
result meets traditional arguments of the literature on management, which stresses
‘psychic distance’ as a major impediment to the decision of companies to enter
foreign markets: ‘psychic proximity’ would reduce either perceived uncertainty
or learning costs about the target countries (see Habib and Zurawicki, 2002, for
a short review). Finally, if institutions depend on economic and social history
(including the colonisation era), then one could observe more FDI, other things
equal, amongst countries displaying relatively similar institutions.
To our knowledge, only Habib and Zurawicki (2002) have to date studied the impact
of institutional distance on bilateral FDI. Focusing on corruption, they ﬁnd that
the absolute difference of the corruption index between the investor and the host
country has a negative impact on bilateral FDI. This interesting result, based on
only one aspect of institutional quality, has remained quite isolated in the literature
so far. In order to generalise this type of result, one has to deal with systematic
measurements of institutional ‘quality’. Indeed, the judgement on institution qual-
ity can be subject to debates. One reason comes from the way data on institutions are
collected – through local experts, miscellaneous observations or a survey in one
host country (often the United States). A second reason is the selection of items
to be included in the governance indices. A third reason is the interpretation to be
given to some items like, for instance, the type of law (common law versus civil law) or
the extent of labour market regulations. We use a new database with detailed
information on a wide variety of institutional characteristics to give the most precise
results possible, and we do not make any attempt to aggregate the various items, which
would mean weighting them and assuming some substitutability among them.
 
3. DATA ON INSTITUTIONS
 
North (1993) deﬁnes institutions as ‘the humanly devised constraints that
structure human interaction’. He further distinguishes ‘formal constraints (rules,
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laws, constitutions)’ from ‘informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions,
and self imposed codes of conduct)’ and from enforcement characteristics.
Several databases are now available that try to measure these various aspects of
institutions. Here we use a newly available database – 
 
Institutional Proﬁles
 
 –
which describes both formal and informal institutions at a highly detailed level.
However, this database does not provide any time series, and it focuses on
developing countries, which prevents studying the impact of institutional distance
between the source country and the destination country. In a second step, we use
the Fraser Institute’s database which provides fewer details on institutions but for
a larger sample of countries with some time dimension.
The 
 
Institutional Proﬁles
 
 (IP) database is based on a survey conducted in 2001
by the foreign network of the French Ministry of Finance in 52 countries.
 
3
 
 A total
of 330 elementary questions were asked concerning public institutions, capital
markets, goods markets and labour markets. In each case, a set of questions were
asked covering political institutions, public order, public governance, market
freedom, investment on future, ability to reform, security of transactions and
contracts, regulation, openness and social cohesion. Each question was itself
decomposed into elementary, objective items ranked 0 or 1 (low level or weak
enforcement) to 4 (high level). The advantages of this database are the following.
First, the respondents are relatively homogeneous since all of them are French
civil servants working in each of the countries surveyed. Second, the way the
variables are constructed, by adding the same elementary items with the same
weights, provides relatively objective and comparable synthetic measures of
institutions. Here we work at the ﬁrst level of aggregation, i.e. on 75 institutional
variables. Finally, a large number of institutional aspects are covered in the
database. Naturally, these advantages come along with some drawbacks. First,
only one year is available (2001). Second, only a few developed countries are
included in the sample, which reduces the scope for studying the impact of the
institutional environment of the source country as well as institutional distance
between the source and the host.
The 
 
Fraser Institute
 
 database provides indices of economic freedom based on
three key notions: individual choice and voluntary transaction, free competition,
personal and property protection. These notions are then detailed along several
aspects of the economy, using miscellaneous sources such as the World
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report, the PRS Group International
Country Risk Guide, or even more classical sources such as the IMF International
Financial Statistics. Our motivation for using this database is principally based
on its time dimension. Indeed, data are available every ﬁve years from 1985 to
 
3
 
 See Berthelier et al. (2003). The database can be downloaded from www.cepii.fr
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2000, and every year since 2000. Furthermore, up to 123 countries are available
in this database.
The OECD FDI data used as a dependent variable (and described below)
cover the years 1985 to 2000. Thus, combining the different datasets’ availabil-
ities, the cross-sectional work on the IP database will rely on year 2000 for FDI,
while the panel data analysis will use 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 for both FDI
and the institutional data (Fraser Institute variables).
 
4. METHODOLOGY
 
a. Dependent Variable
 
Our dependent variable is the bilateral FDI stock. There are several advantages
in working on stocks rather than ﬂows. First, foreign investors decide on the
worldwide allocation of output, hence on capital stocks. Second, stocks account
for foreign direct investment being ﬁnanced through local capital markets, hence
it is a better measure of capital ownership (Devereux and Grifﬁth, 2002). Finally,
stocks are much less volatile than ﬂows which are sometimes dependent on one
or two large takeovers, especially in relatively small countries.
We use the OECD database on bilateral stocks of FDI. In terms of country
coverage, most observations correspond to FDI originating from each of the
different OECD member countries, and located in either OECD countries, or
emerging and developing economies. FDI stocks are converted to millions of
current US dollars over the 1985–2000 period, and a non-negligible portion of
observations are zeros (3,341 out of a total of 15,559 observations). Working on
the logarithm of FDI then imposes to drop these observations, with a potential
selection bias. Several solutions are possible to circumvent this problem. The
ﬁrst, and perhaps most used one, consists of working with ln(
 
a
 
 + FDI) instead of
ln(FDI), with a relatively small constant 
 
a
 
. Using 
 
a
 
 = 1 allows setting to zero
the dependent variable when FDI is zero. However, it would substantially com-
press the distribution of FDI here because of the unit used. We use 
 
a
 
 = 0.3, which
corresponds to the ﬁrst decile of the distribution of strictly positive FDI values.
A recent alternative method to avoid the selection bias and deal with zeros in
gravity equations is the Poisson QMLE proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) for trade in goods and used in a bilateral FDI equation by Head and Ries
(2006). The method does not lend itself easily to instrumental variables regres-
sions though. We use this second method as a robustness check in unreported
regressions. The results for our benchmark regressions contained in Table 1
(available on request from the authors) are qualitatively similar and give stronger
effects of institutions on FDI, which makes us conﬁdent that our results are
robust to the chosen treatment of zeros.
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b. The Basic Model
 
What are the determinants of the location choice made by a multinational ﬁrm
for its production unit? The ﬁrst analysis of how foreign direct investors locate
their afﬁliates draws on the traditional endowments theory framework. When
factors are mobile, perfectly competitive owners of capital locate it wherever its
returns are higher, that is, preferably in countries where it is scarce, the developing
world. However, this North-South view of capital ﬂows where only relative costs
matter has been radically amended in order to better match with actual patterns
of location choices. Three radical departures have been notably made with respect to
the traditional paradigm. First, increasing returns and imperfect competition have
been combined with the existence of transport costs to explain the existence of
multinational ﬁrms locating afﬁliates abroad in order to be closer to consumers
and gain market shares over rivals this way. This has been called the 
 
horizontal
motive
 
 for FDI, as ﬁrst proposed formally by Markusen (1984). Second, different
stages of production have been introduced in the analysis, with countries differ-
ing in the production costs for each of those stages, and multinational ﬁrms
locating according to the patterns of comparative advantages of countries in each
stage of production. Helpman (1984) ﬁrst introduced a model of this type, which
is commonly referred to as the 
 
vertical motive
 
 for FDI. There have been several
attempts to provide a synthesis of the two modelling structures, notably by
Markusen and Venables (1998 and 2000). They suggest that the gravity model,
which relates FDI between two countries 
 
i
 
 and 
 
j
 
 to the size of each partner,
bilateral distance and a set of variables accounting for relative costs, is consistent
with this new strand of the literature. Indeed, the gravity model has been widely
used in the literature for explaining bilateral FDI (see Wei, 2000). Note that a
very recent theoretical motivation for FDI gravity equations has been proposed
by Head and Ries (forthcoming), where FDI is motivated through a worldwide
competition among capital owners for corporate control over ﬁrms. As for
trade ﬂows where several radically different theoretical models have been
shown to yield gravity-like predictions, the main explanatory theories of green-
ﬁeld FDI as well as mergers and acquisitions yield a gravity equation, which
thus seems to be a very robust econometric prediction for both ﬂows of goods
and capital.
Following this background, our basic equation to be estimated is the following:
(1)
where FDI
 
ij
 
 is the FDI stock in country 
 
j
 
 originating from country 
 
i
 
, GRAV
 
ij
 
 is
a vector of gravity variables, INST
 
ij
 
 a vector of institutional variables, 
 
a
 
0
 
 the
intercept, 
 
a
 
1
 
 the vector of gravity coefﬁcients, 
 
a
 
2
 
 the vector of institutional
coefﬁcients and 
 
u
 
ij
 
 the residual.
ln( .   )        ,0 3 0 1 2+ = + + +FDI GRAV INSTij ij ij ija a a u′ ′
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The variables included in the gravity vector GRAV
 
ij
 
 are standard: they include
the GDPs of both the source (
 
i
 
) and the host country (
 
j
 
), geographic distance
between both countries, and dummies for contiguity and for common language.
Here we add GDP per capita to the gravity setting. The impact of GDP per capita
on inward FDI is theoretically ambiguous. This is because high GDP per capita
reﬂects both high purchasing power of consumers and high real wages. However,
empirical studies generally show GDP per capita to have a positive, although not
always signiﬁcant, impact on inward FDI. Omitting this variable could lead to
spurious results due to potentially high correlation between institutions and GDP
per capita: a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the institution variable could in fact cover
the hidden, positive impact of GDP per capita.
GDP (in current USD) and GDP per capita (in PPP USD) are taken from
the World Bank WDI database. The distance variable is calculated as a mean
distance between the main towns of each country (source: CEPII databases on
bilateral distances, available at www.cepii.fr). Dummies for contiguity and for
common language are also from CEPII’s databases. Like distance, these two
variables account for various transaction costs incurred when investing abroad.
In turn, the vector of institutional variables INST
 
ij
 
 includes a measure of
institutional ‘quality’ for the destination country (
 
j
 
) and, when possible, also the
same measure for the origin country (
 
i
 
) as well as a measure of ‘institutional
distance’ between the two countries. The latter is deﬁned as the absolute difference
of institutional ‘quality’ between the origin and the destination country.
The estimation of equation (1) encounters two problems which need to be
tackled: possible endogeneity of institutions, and collinearity between institutions
and GDP per capita.
 
c. Tackling Endogeneity and Multicollinearity
 
One cannot rule out 
 
a priori
 
 that institutions are endogenous to FDI:
economic openness could well act as a vector of reform in emerging countries,
in particular through pressure exerted by newly established afﬁliates to see
institutions reformed in order to improve the business climate. Hence, it may be
necessary to instrument institutions. We follow the institutions-and-growth
literature (Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; and Acemoglu et al., 2001) for
the choice of instruments. The latitude and longitude of the country appear to be
good instruments since they are correlated to most institution variables but
should not be a direct factor inﬂuencing bilateral FDI. We also use the number
of religions and a dummy for monotheism as proxies for ethno-social fragmentation
of the population, with a possible negative impact on institutions suggested by
Alesina et al. (1999). Conversely, we do not retain landlockness as an instrument,
since it can constitute a direct impediment to inward FDI, through increased
export costs for afﬁliates. We do not retain either the mortality rate of settlers
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used by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and followers since this variable is speciﬁc to
former colonies, and would thus reduce our sample.
When working on panel data, the presence of country ﬁxed effects rules out
the use of above-mentioned instruments. In this case, we simply use the ﬁve-year
lagged value of institution ‘quality’ as the instrument.
As already mentioned, institution variables are likely to be correlated to GDP
per capita. In order to tackle this second problem, each institution variable is
orthogonalised to GDP per capita through the following three-step procedure:
First, the institutional variable INST
 
k
 
 is regressed on the logarithm of GDP per
capita ln(GDPCAP
 
k
 
) for both the origin country and the destination country (
 
k
 
 = 
 
i
 
, 
 
j
 
):
INST
 
k
 
 = 
 
b
 
0
 
 + 
 
b
 
1
 
 ln(GDPCAP
 
k
 
) + 
 
v
 
k
 
. (2)
We then construct 
 
v
 
ij
 
 = |
 
v
 
i
 
 
 
−
 
 
 
v
 
j
 
| and deﬁne the following 3 
 
× 
 
1 vector: 
 
V
 
ij
 
 = (
 
v
 
i
 
, 
 
v
 
j
 
, 
 
v
 
ij
 
).
 
V
 
ij
 
 can be interpreted as the institutional ‘qualities’ and ‘distance’ not related to
the level of GDP per capita.
Second, the residual vector 
 
V
 
ij
 
 is instrumented by a vector of instruments IV
 
ij
 
.
As already mentioned, in cross-section estimations, the instruments include, for
both countries, the absolute value of latitude and of longitude, the number of
religions and by a dummy representing whether the main religion is monotheist.
In panel-data estimations, the 
 
V
 
ij
 
 vector is simply instrumented by its lagged
value. Given the ﬁve-year frequency of the Fraser database, this amounts to lagging
institutional characteristics by ﬁve years:
 
V
 
ij
 
 = 
 
c
 
0
 
 + 
 
c1IVij + wij. (3)
Third, equation (1) is estimated by replacing the institutional vector INSTij by
its instrumented value .4
d. Deﬁning the Institutional Vector
As already mentioned, the IP database covers 330 elementary questions.
Because institution variables are often correlated with one another, it is generally
not possible to include several institutions in the same equation. One possibility
would be to aggregate all institution variables into their ﬁrst principal component.
However, this would imply assuming substitutability between institution variables
4 Following Pagan (1984), the use of residual-generated regressors does not bias the estimation of
 in cases like equation (1). Furthermore, the estimated variance of  in Stage 3 is correct. It is
nevertheless necessary to bootstrap the residuals of Stage 3 due to the instrumentation of Vij. This
is what is done here.
  IINST IVij ijc c    = +0 1
a2′ a2′
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which belong to very different areas. Here we limit the extent of substitutability
by working at the semi-detailed level, i.e. with 75 variables aggregated from a
few homogeneous items in the IP database (three-digit level). This choice allows
us to look at the ranking of institutional characteristics according to their role in
attracting FDI. Hence, we introduce each of the 75 institution variables from the
IP database successively in a cross-section estimation where the institutional
vector is limited to only one variable – the institutional characteristic of the
destination country.
In a second step, we perform panel data estimations on the basis of the Fraser
database. The institutional variables used in this second step are chosen so as to
offer enough observations in the time dimension for instrumentation by lagged
values to be implemented. The institutional vector (INSTij) now includes the
institutional variable for both the origin and the destination country, together with
institutional ‘distance’. Time ﬁxed effects are included in order to account for the
simultaneous rise in FDI and improvement in institutions observed over time.
Before turning to econometrics, we want to illustrate graphically the relationship
between FDI and some of the institutional variables most frequently used by
economists: protection of property rights in general and intellectual property
rights in particular, the quality of the judicial system, and the quality of bureaucracy.
Each of these four variables is available freely and very easily to researchers in
the Fraser Institute database which we use in Figures 1 and 2. The Y-axis in those
ﬁgures represents the log of FDI stock residual from a simplistic gravity equation,
where only the two GDPs and bilateral distance are considered on the right-hand
side. It therefore represents what remains to be explained in the international allo-
cation of FDI after simple gravity forces have been taken into account.
The X-axis represents the host country’s value of the index for the institutional
variable represented. In each graph, a regression line is also represented, showing
FIGURE 1
US FDI Stock in 2000 and Property Rights
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that there is a positive and often strong relationship for all four variables presented
here. It can also be immediately seen that all those variables are quite strongly
correlated with the level of development of the host countries. The next section
will proceed with a more complete estimation procedure than what can be shown
in simple graphs, and will deal in particular with the endogeneity and multicolline-
arity issues described above.
5. THE RESULTS
a. The Standard Gravity Model
The results for the simple gravity model are displayed in Table 1. Columns
(1) to (3) provide the results for cross-country estimations for the year 2000,
while (1′ ) to (3′ ) show the same results from panel estimations with time ﬁxed
effects over 1985–2000. In (1) and (1′ ), only gravity variables are included as
regressors. As usual in this type of estimation, the overall ﬁt is relatively high.
This conﬁrms that the gravity model is a good and robust empirical description
of international patterns of capital investment. All standard gravity variables are
signiﬁcant at the one per cent level, and correctly signed: the GDPs of both
countries have a positive impact on bilateral FDI whereas geographic distance
impacts negatively. Common language and contiguity dummies have a positive
impact on FDI. In addition, GDP per capita in both the origin country and in the
destination country have a signiﬁcant and positive impact on bilateral FDI. The
positive impact of GDP per capita in the destination country suggests that GDP
per capita covers attractive features such as consumers’ purchasing power, labour
productivity or institutions.
FIGURE 2
US FDI Stock in 2000, Bureaucracy and Judiciary Systems
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In columns (2) and (2′ ), a representative measure of institutions (property
rights security, the same as in panel (a) of Figure 1)5 is simply added to the
equation (without any orthogonalisation or instrumentation). For the sake of
comparability, we use the same variable – taken from the Fraser database –
in both the cross-section (2) and panel data (2′ ) estimations. For the year 2000
(for which the sample is the widest), the availability of this variable reduces the
sample somehow in column (2), but there are still 53 origin countries, with an
average of 24 destination countries for their FDI stock (the maximum is 50
destination countries). Introducing an institutional variable in the equation has no
impact on the coefﬁcients on both GDPs, on distance, on common language and
contiguity dummies, and on GDP per capita in the source country. However,
5 The choice of the property right security variable is dictated by the literature and by its large time
coverage.
TABLE 1
Bilateral FDI and the Protection of Property Rights
Model: Dependent Variable: Log of Bilateral FDI Stock
Cross-section (2000) Panel (1985–2000)
(1) (2) (3) (1′) (2′) (3′)
ln origin GDP 1.18a 1.19a 1.19a 1.11a 1.14a 1.14a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln destination GDP 0.83a 0.84a 0.84a 0.86a 0.86a 0.88a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
ln distance −0.75a −0.73a −0.73a −0.49a −0.53a −0.51a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Common language 1.97a 1.92a 1.91a 1.88a 1.77a 1.79a
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Contiguity 0.89a 0.93a 0.93a 0.67a 0.65a 0.66a
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
ln origin GDP per cap. 1.99a 1.95a 1.95a 1.88a 1.89a 1.89a
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
ln destination GDP per cap. 0.21b 0.02 0.32a 0.06
(0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.12)
Property rights protec., dest. 0.08 0.09a 0.11b 0.12a
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
 N 1,325 1,275 1,275 14,738 3,244 3,267
 R2 0.718 0.72 0.72 0.619 0.66 0.656
RMSE 1.896 1.89 1.889 2.104 2.004 2.026
Notes:
Standard deviations between parentheses: a, b and c respectively refers to 1, 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance levels.
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and take into account the potential correlation of errors in the
cases of multiple observations for each country pair in columns (1′) to (3′) (see Wooldridge, 2002). The
property right variable is taken from the Fraser Institute.
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GDP per capita in the host country is no longer signiﬁcant in both the cross-
section estimation and in the panel estimation. As to property right protection, it
is signiﬁcant only in the panel estimation (column (2′ )). When GDP per capita
of the host country is removed from the estimation (columns (3) and (3′)),
property right protection becomes signiﬁcant at the one per cent level. Hence this
ﬁrst round of estimations illustrates the needs to tackle possible multicollinearity
between GDP per capita and institutions. We now turn to the results from our
three-step estimation procedure.
b. Cross-country Estimations
The results obtained from our three-step procedure for IP data are reported in
Table 2 for the 20 best ﬁts (out of 75 regressions).6 The ﬁrst column of Table 2
reports the coefﬁcient obtained in Step 1 when regressing each institution
variable on GDP per capita for the host country. In most cases, the coefﬁcient is
signiﬁcant at the one per cent level, and positive. Hence, there is generally a high
correlation between institutions and GDP per capita. There are two exceptions,
however: weak concentration of capital seems to be uncorrelated with GDP per
capita; and decentralisation of wage bargaining is negatively correlated with
GDP per capita. Indeed, wage-bargaining centralisation is mostly a feature of
developed countries.
The second column reports the Fisher statistics from Step 2, i.e. the standard
test for the global power of the set of instruments used. In all cases but six, the
null hypothesis of non-signiﬁcance of our set of instruments can be rejected. The
values reported furthermore imply that our instruments are quite powerful in
explaining institutional differences across countries reported in the IP database,
for the majority of institutional variables.
The remaining columns summarise the results from Step 3: coefﬁcient on
GDP per capita, coefﬁcient on (instrumented) institution, and adjusted R2. In
most cases, both GDP per capita and institutions have a signiﬁcant and positive
impact on bilateral FDI. This means that good institutions in the host country
have a positive impact on inward FDI in addition to the impact of GDP per capita
(which is itself correlated to institutions). Classical variables such as easiness to
enter a market or create a company, bankruptcy laws, lack of corruption or
contract law fall into this category. Furthermore, the table highlights the importance
of information (on ﬁrms, on goods’ quality) and of the banking sector (internal
control, competition, guarantee of loans) for inward FDI.
6 Ranking the results according to their contribution in explaining the variance of the explained
variable is more appropriate than looking at the t-statistics on the institutional variable because of
possible collinearity with other variables such as distance, for instance.
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In two cases (weak concentration of capital, existence and enforcement of
labour laws), institutions have a negative impact: FDI inﬂows are lower when
capital is less concentrated and when labour laws are strong. The effect of labour
laws can be interpreted as the detrimental impact of such laws on labour ﬂexibility
and cost. As for the effect of capital concentration, it could be related to
increased competition (hence lower proﬁt rates) when capital is less concentrated.
This interpretation would be consistent with the non-signiﬁcance of the ‘com-
petition – production sector’ variable. Alternatively, the negative impact of a
weak concentration of capital, hence the positive impact of capital concentration,
could be linked to agglomeration forces (multinational ﬁrms are more likely to
invest in a country when they have already invested heavily in the past), and to
the existence of public monopolies to be privatised.
Finally, in seven cases, institutions seem to have no signiﬁcant impact on
inward FDI when GDP per capita is controlled for. Interestingly, these variables
TABLE 2
Cross-section Results with IP Data 
(Year 2000)
Institutions: Dependent Variable: ln(0.3 + FDIij)
GDPcap 
(Step 1)
Fisher 
(Step 2)
GDPcap 
(Step 3)
Instit. 
(Host)
Adj. 
R2
Weak concentration of capital 0.03 11.66a 0.27a −1.23a 0.73
Existence and enforcement of labour laws 0.88a 5.30a 0.24a −0.57a 0.72
Information on ﬁrms 0.92a 6.82a 0.20b 0.47a 0.72
Easiness to enter a market 0.66a 6.54a 0.20b 0.63a 0.72
Government efﬁciency – evolution 0.79a 0.92 0.29a 0.58 0.72
Information on the quality of goods and services 0.80a 12.42a 0.29a 0.33a 0.72
Internal control of banks 0.48a 10.60a 0.24a 0.26a 0.72
Easiness to create a company 0.58a 13.58a 0.14 0.57a 0.72
Ability of bank executives 0.84a 5.23a 0.27a 0.23 0.72
Social mobility – recruitment and promotion 0.72c 4.32a 0.31a 0.40 0.71
Lack of corruption 1.20b 1.80 0.19 0.69a 0.71
Bank and ﬁnancial supervision 0.84a 1.55 0.21 0.39 0.72
Bankruptcy law 0.94a 4.79a 0.27a 0.36b 0.71
Competition – banks 0.23 4.94a 0.35a 0.42b 0.71
Decentralisation of wage bargaining −0.57b 1.56 0.31a 0.26 0.71
Extension of insurance and pension fund sector 0.35b 2.32 0.29a 0.36 0.71
Contract law 0.32a 6.14a 0.28a 0.57a 0.71
Information on banks 0.59a 9.84a 0.27a 0.25 0.71
Guarantee of bank lending (mortgage, etc.) 0.93a 5.37a 0.22b 0.56a 0.71
Competition – production sector 0.39a 0.39 0.29a 0.08 0.71
Notes:
a, b and c respectively refers to 1, 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance levels. Standard deviations account for
correlations among errors for each host country (see Wooldridge, 2002). GDPcap stands for GDP per capita in
the host country, and Instit. for the corresponding institutional variable in the host country, too.
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are seldom mentioned in the literature on institutions and growth. As can be seen
from a comparison of columns (2) and (4), the insigniﬁcance of an institutional
variable seems to be mostly related to the weakness of the instruments for this
precise case. The equivalent in the IP database of the property right protection
variable used in the previous section, called ‘formal property rights’, is ranked
26th in terms of ﬁt,7 and the institutional variable enters with a ﬁve per cent
signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient of 0.26 in the third stage and a highly signiﬁcant
Fisher statistic larger than seven in the second stage.
We conclude that the quality of some institutions in the host country has a
sizeable impact on inward FDI even when the direct and indirect impact of GDP
per capita is accounted for: institutions exert an independent role which can be
quite large economically. For instance, comparing a host country j1 with a high
level of corruption (a ‘lack of corruption’ variable equal to 1) to a country j2 with
the lowest level of corruption (variable equal to 4), j2 is estimated to receive
exp(3 × 0.69) = 7.9 times more FDI (the transformed dependent variable, 0.3 +
FDIij, more precisely) than country j1. For internal control of bank (which yields
the lowest, positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient in Table 2), the same exercise
leads to a 2.2 ratio between FDI received by j2 and by j1. These ﬁgures can be
compared, for instance, with the impact of gravity variables. Turning back to
Table 1, contiguity, for example, only multiplies the dependent variable by
exp(0.9) = 2.45. In addition, the impact of institutions seems usually much larger
than that of GDP per capita. Indeed, the coefﬁcient on GDP per capita in Step 3
ranges from 0.2 to 0.3. Hence, increasing GDP per capita by 300 per cent leads
to a rise in inward FDI by 122–135 per cent.
This is an encouraging result in the sense that independent (i.e. independent
from GDP per capita) improvements in institutions should attract FDI and could
therefore provide a basis for growth and development. We now turn to the results
obtained with panel data.
c. Panel Data Estimations
Panel data estimation results are displayed in Table 3, for six different institution
variables displaying enough observations in the time dimension and for which
instrumentation was feasible. The ﬁrst two columns show that three institution
variables appear highly and positively correlated to GDP per capita: credit exten-
sion, credit market regulations, and property right security. As for cross-country
estimations, wage-bargaining decentralisation is negatively correlated to GDP
per capita. Finally, the two other labour market institutions (legal constraints in
recruiting and ﬁring, and regulation of labour market) seem to be unrelated to
GDP per capita.
7 Hence not displayed in Table 2.
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TABLE 3
Panel Results with Fraser Data 
(1985–2000)
Institutions: Dependent Variable: ln(0.3 + FDIij)
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
GDPcap 
Orig.
GDPcap
Dest.
Fisher 
Orig.
Fisher 
Dest.
Fisher 
Dist.
GDPcap 
Orig.
GDPcap 
Dest.
Inst. 
Orig.
Inst. 
Dest.
Inst. 
Dist.
Adj. 
R2
No. 
Obs.
Credit extension 1.21a 1.22a 10.53a 1.94 39.99a 0.82 3.31 −2.20 −4.04 −1.80 0.79 1,493
Credit market regulation 1.89a 1.86a 28.48a 2.01 39.13b 1.22 −0.10 −0.59a 0.57a −0.34a 0.79 1,493
Legal constraints on recruiting and ﬁring −0.12 0.02 1.16 3.17b 177.32a −2.81 −4.00a −0.19 −0.45a −0.11a 0.82 1,104
Per cent of labour force with 
decentralised wage negotiation −0.55b −0.64a 23.18a 5.12a 349.30a 2.61b 0.01 0.14 0.47b −0.14a 0.81 1,380
Regulation of labour market 0.36 0.17 4.39a 0.31 396.09a 3.09 −3.56 −0.66 0.91 −0.07 0.80 1,301
Property rights security 1.97a 1.89a 4.98a 2.42 9.02a 7.76 −3.03 1.45 −1.57 −0.25 0.73 1,557
Notes:
a, b and c respectively refers to 1, 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance levels. Standard deviations account for correlations among errors for each host country (see Wooldridge,
2002).
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The next three columns show that our instrument (the lagged valued of the Vij,
see Section 4) is generally appropriate. The remainder of the table reports the
results from Step 3 estimations. Two institutions of the host country have a
positive and signiﬁcant impact on inward FDI: credit market regulations, and
decentralisation of wage negotiations. Legal constraints on recruiting and ﬁring
have a signiﬁcant, negative impact on inward FDI, which is consistent with the
negative impact of the ‘Existence and enforcement of labour laws’ in cross-
country estimations (Table 2). Interestingly, property right protection is no longer
signiﬁcant now that correlation with GDP per capita is controlled for, contrasting
with Table 1. On the whole, half of the institutional variables are signiﬁcant both
for the destination country and for the institutional distance. This is consistent
with the results obtained with the IP database where 56 per cent out of 75
institutional variables are signiﬁcant for the host country, at the ten per cent
conﬁdence level.
Conversely, institution variables of the origin country have little impact on
outward FDI. Finally, institutional distance always has a negative impact on FDI,
and this impact is signiﬁcant for credit market regulations, legal constraints in
recruiting and ﬁring, and decentralisation of wage bargaining. Hence the results
suggest that institutional distance is more important than the quality of institutions
in the host country. This is especially important since South-South FDI is developing:8
relatively less developed institutions could be a weaker impediment to inward
FDI from emerging countries than from OECD countries.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we re-visit the impact of institutional ‘quality’ on bilateral FDI.
The detailed Institutional Proﬁle database is used to highlight the main institu-
tions that matter, while controlling for reverse causality from FDI to institutions
as well as for collinearity between institutions and GDP per capita. In a second
step, the impact of source country institutions and of institutional ‘distance’ are
studied along the same lines, based on the Fraser database.
We ﬁnd that institutions matter independently of GDP per capita. In particular,
our results point out bureaucracy, corruption, but also information, banking
sector and legal institutions as important determinants of inward FDI. Interest-
ingly, weak capital concentration and employment protection tend to reduce
inward FDI.
While ‘good’ institutions almost always increase the amount of FDI received,
no general result applies to outward FDI. Finally, we show that institutional
distance tends to reduce bilateral FDI.
8 See, for instance, The World Bank, Global Development Finance 2005.
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These results are encouraging in the sense that efforts towards raising the
quality of institutions and making them converge towards those of source countries
may help developing countries to receive more FDI, hence help them to catch
up, independently of the indirect impact of higher GDP per capita. The orders of
magnitude found in the paper are large, meaning that moving from a low level
to a high level of institutional quality could have as much impact as suddenly
becoming a neighbour of a source country.
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